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A M E N D M E N T
"I Love a Parade": Can a Group's
Participation in a Privately
Organized Parade be Compelled?
by Jay E. Grenig
.~\\' ,
Sp:v
An Irish-American gay,
lesbian, and bisexual
group wanted to march in .
Boston's St. Patrick's Day-
Evacuation Day Parade.
The organizer refused to '.
grant permission. Holding
that the organizer '
violated Massachusetts
public accommodations
law that prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis -
of sexual orientation in
public places, the
Massachusetts courts, C'
including its high court,
ordered the organizer to
permit the group to
participate. Now the
Supreme Court decides if .C-
the state courts' decisions
violate the Parade 7
organizer's right of
expressive association.
Jay E. Grenig is professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School, 1103 West Wisconsin
Avenue, Milwaukee, WI 53233;
(414) 288-5377.
ISSUE
Is a parade organizer's First
Amendment right of expressive
association violated when a state
court, enforcing the state's nondis-
crimination law, orders the organiz-
er to allow a group to participate in
the parade despite the organizer's
prior refusal to permit the group's
participation?
FACTS
During the first half of the
twentieth century, the South Boston
Citizens Association and the City of
Boston, Massachusetts, organized
various Evacuation Day activities.
(Evacuation Day commemorates
George Washington's initial military
victory over the British in 1776
and the British departure from
South Boston.)
Boston celebrated the 125th
anniversary of Evacuation Day in
1901 with a parade, artillery salute,
fireworks display, and concerts.
In 1947 then-Mayor James Michael
Curley granted the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council
(the "Veterans Council" or the
"Council") the authority to organize
and conduct the Parade. The event,
now known as the St. Patrick's Day-
Evacuation Day Parade (the "Parade"),
also commemorates St. Patrick's
Day, which, like Evacuation Day,
falls on March 17.
Over the years, the Parade has
involved as many as 20,000 partici-
pants and as many as 1,000,000
spectators. In 1992 the parade fea-
tured about 10,000 participants and
some 750,000 spectators. It is one of
the six largest parades held in
Boston annually and the largest New
England event for Irish-Americans.
Until recently, the Veterans Council
had no written guidelines or proce-
dures for selecting sponsors and par-
ticipants. The Parade appeared open
to virtually any group. Between 1947
and 1992, the only groups excluded
from the parade have been the Ku
Klux Klan and an antibusing group.
JOHN J. HURLEY, INDIVIDUALLY
AND THE SOUTH BOSTON ALLIED
WAR VETERANS COUNCIL V
IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN, AND
BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON, AN
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION, BY
AND THROUGH TIMOTHY DALEY,
BARBRA KAY, AND CATHLEEN FIN
Docket No. 94-749
ARGUMENT DATE:
APRIL 25, 1995
FROM: THE SUPREME JUCICIAL
COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
In 1992 several individuals formed
the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston
("GLIB"). GLIB is a social organiza-
tion of persons who are homosexual
or bisexual and their supporters.
GLIB's purpose is to express its
members' pride in their dual identi-
ties as Irish or Irish-Americans who
are also homosexual or bisexual; to
demonstrate to the Irish-American
community and to the gay, lesbian,
and bisexual community the diversi-
ty within both communities; and to
show support for Irish-American
homosexual and bisexual men and
women in New York City who were
seeking to participate in that city's
St. Patrick's Day Parade.
GLIB was formed in part to
march in South Boston's annual
St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day
Parade. When GLIB submitted an
application to participate, the
Council denied it, citing safety
reasons and insufficient information
regarding GLIB. GLIB ultimately
marched in the Parade pursuant to
a state court order.
In 1993 GLIB again filed an applica-
tion with the Veterans Council to
march in that year's Parade and,
again, the Council refused to admit
the group, asserting that its decision
to exclude groups with sexual
themes merely formalized the
Parade's express traditional religious
and social values.
GLIB responded by securing another
state court order mandating their
participation in the 1993 Parade. In
issuing the order, the state trial
court, noting the absence of proce-
dures and criteria for selecting
Parade sponsors and participants,
found that
applications for participation in
the next year's Parade are sent to
all previous participants. Those
who call to inquire about
participating in the Parade are
sent applications, and depending
upon the monies available they
are reimbursed for their travel
expenses or costs of performance.
Applications from new groups are
voted on in batches, and the
Veterans Council does not
generally inquire into the specific
messages or views of each
participant.
In addition, some groups
participate in the Parade without
submitting an application to the
Veterans Council. For instance,
in 1993, the Boston Bruins did
not apply to the Veterans
Council, but simply showed up at
the Parade and marched. Other
groups gained entrance by
making a contribution to the
Parade rather than filling out an
application form. Thus, the
procedures for admittance into
the Parade are not uniformly
applied.
The state trial court concluded
that the Parade did not have an
expressive purpose because of the
Council's nonselectivity in choosing
sponsors and participants. According
to the court, the Council's nonselec-
tive organization of the Parade
meant that it was not an expressive
associational activity entitled to
First Amendment protection.
The court went on to conclude that
the Parade was a place of public
accommodation under Massachusetts
law and that excluding GLIB from
the Parade violated the State's public
accommodations law which pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in places of public
accommodation. See MAss. GEN. L.
ch. 272 §§ 92A and 98. (A place of
public accommodation is "any place
... which is open to and accepts or
solicits the patronage of the general
public" and includes "a boardwalk or
other public highway" and "a place
of public amusement, recreation,
sport, exercise, or entertainment."
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 92.)
The Council canceled the 1994
Parade to avoid GLIB's participa-
tion. However, a motorcade traveled
the Parade route on the scheduled
day displaying black flags to protest
the state court's orders.
The Council also appealed to
the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, the State's highest
court, which affirmed. 636 N.E.2d
1293 (Ma. 1994). The Massachusetts
high court held that the Council
had violated GLIB's rights under
the State's public accommodations
law. According to the court, the
1993 Parade had no discernible
expressive purpose and, therefore,
was a public accommodation sub-
ject to Massachusetts' prohibition
against sexual-orientation discrimi-
nation in public accommodations
within the State. The court
explained that the Parade fell with-
in the scope of the State's public
accommodations law because it
occurred on public streets and pro-
vided entertainment, recreation,
and amusement to participants and
spectators. However, the high court
acknowledged that the relevant
facts could change materially and a
future Parade might constitute
expressive associational activity
within the meaning of the First
Amendment and, thus, would be
entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, including the right to
exclude GLIB and other groups.
The Veterans Council filed a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court seeking review of
the decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court which was granted.
115 S. Ct. 714 (1995). Shortly after
the Court accepted the case, GLIB
filed a suggestion of mootness. (A
case is moot when, for whatever
reason, there is no dispute for a
court to resolve.)
(Continued on Page 338)
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GLIB pointed out that on April 19,
1994, the Veterans Council adopted
written standards to govern future
Parades and that, under the newly
adopted standards, participation
would be by invitation only, and the
Parade would commemorate the role
of traditional families in Irish history
and the Council's decision to cancel
the 1994 parade to protest the judi-
cial imposition of messages. Based
on these changes, GLIB agrees that
the Parade is expressive association-
al activity protected by the First
Amendment and, accordingly, agrees
that the Council has the right to
exclude it from participation. GLIB's
concession is not surprising, howev-
er, because, after adopting its
parade-participation standards, the
Veterans Council went to federal dis-
trict court and obtained a judgment
that the 1995 Parade is protected by
the First Amendment.
CASE ANALYSIS
The First Amendment protects the
right of persons to associate for
expressive purposes. New York State
Club Ass'n, Inc. v. State of New
York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988). The
Constitution also guarantees free-
dom of association for purposes of
engaging in activities protected by
the First Amendment. Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984).
A parade may constitute expressive
conduct under the First Amendment.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147 (1969). In determining
whether or not particular conduct,
including a parade, possesses suffi-
cient communicative elements to
bring the First Amendment into
play, a court looks to see if there is
an intent to convey a particularized
message and also assesses the likeli-
hood that the message will be under-
stood by those who view it. Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Parades sponsored by private organi-
zations and containing a variety of
participants and themes have been
accorded constitutional protection.
See, e.g., Long Beach Lesbian & Gay
Pride, Inc. v. City of Long Beach,
17 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Cal. App. 1993)
(holding that a festive parade with
cars, floats, and pedestrians
designed to commemorate the gay
and lesbian civil rights movement
and to commemorate the price par-
ticipants pay for their sexual orien-
tation is protected by the First
Amendment); New York County Bd.
of Ancient Order of Hibernians v.
Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (celebratory parade designed
to honor St. Patrick and to proclaim
allegiance to Roman Catholic
Church protected by the First
Amendment).
GLIB's concession that the 1995
Parade and all future Parades
organized under the Council's 1994
guidelines are protected by the First
Amendment means that the issue in
this case has become whether or not
the earlier parades were entitled to
First Amendment protection as well.
The Veterans Council argues that its
the earlier parades were entitled to
such protection, insisting that it has
always been selective in choosing
sponsors and participants and that it
has always presented unmistakeable
political, cultural, religious, and
military messages.
GLIB, for its part, maintains that
the state trial court correctly found
that the Veterans Council was nons-
elective in its organization of pre-
1995 Parades and that its nonselec-
tivity took the 1993 Parade out of
the ambit of First Amendment
protection and into the ambit of
Massachusetts public accommoda-
tions law. GLIB stresses that the
state trial court was painstaking in
its fact finding in this case and that
its factual findings are amply sup-
ported by the record. On the record
facts, GLIB contends that the
Massachusetts courts were correct in
holding that the 1993 Parade was
not expressive but, instead, was an
open recreational activity held in the
public streets and, as such, was sub-
ject to the State's law prohibiting
sexual-orientation discrimination in
public accommodations.
SIGNIFICANCE
The central debate in this case is a
factual one. The Veterans Council
insists that the Massachusetts courts
are wrong on the facts and that a
correct finding of the facts would
make it clear that the Parade has
always expressed a defined set of
values and beliefs. GLIB, on the
other hand, maintains that the state
courts correctly found the facts and
that those facts clearly distinguish
the pre-1995 Parades from expres-
sive conduct protected by the First
Amendment and, equally clearly,
bring those Parades within the
scope of Massachusetts public
accommodations law.
The Supreme Court generally
accepts the fact finding of lower
courts. Thus, unless the Court can
say, after reviewing a record that
includes the testimony of 12 wit-
nesses before the state trial court
and that court's review of 113
exhibits, that the findings of fact in
this case are clearly erroneous, it is
not likely to take up the Veterans
Council's invitation to resolve the
factual debate between the parties.
Instead, the Court will take the facts
as found by the Massachusetts courts
and consider their legal significance.
Issue No. 7338
The Court's decision in this case
could result in an articulation of
clear guidelines for determining
what constitutes expressive associa-
tional activity for purposes of the
First Amendment. Is any public con-
gregation of persons engaged in
expressive associational activity sim-
ply by showing up in one place, at
one time, and doing something? Or
must there be some unifying purpose
before the same congregation of per-
sons can be said to be engaging in
expressive associational activity?
The Court's answer to these ques-
tions can go a long way toward obvi-
ating the kind of dispute presented
by this case.
The Court also may address the
issue of whether or not a state has a
compelling interest in prohibiting
discrimination that deprives a per-
son of his or her personal dignity.
One commentator has expressed the
view that "unlike the concern for
equality ... the state's interest in
eliminating the insult, hate, and
divisiveness that accompany invidi-
ous discrimination is not properly
considered 'compelling.'" W.P.
Marshall, Discrimination and the
Right of Association, Nw. U. L. Rev.
68, 97 (1986). On the other hand, a
state may not need a compelling
interest to prohibit discrimination
against a group protected by its
antidiscrimination laws if those who
discriminate in violation of state law
are not entitled to protection of the
First Amendment. Thus, on this
issue, the Court could give substan-
tial guidance on exactly how far
state and local governments can go
to protect persons and groups from
the animus of others.
ARGUMENTS
For John J. Hurley, individually,
and the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council (Counsel of
Record: Chester Darling; 306
Dartmouth Street, Boston, MA
02116; (617) 536-2050):
1. The Veterans' Parade is their
expression, the content of which is
protected by the First Amendment
against government control.
2. The Massachusetts public accom-
modations law is constitutionally
overbroad.
For the Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston, an unincorporated associa-
tion, by and through Timothy
Daley, Barbra Kay, and Cathleen
Finn, acting on their own behalf
and on behalf of the members of
the association (Counsel of Record:
John Ward; Zalkind, Rodriguez, Lunt
& Duncan; 65A Atlantic Avenue,
Boston, MA 02110; (617) 742-6020):
The decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts
adheres to this Court's precedent
and is fully supported by the facts as
found by the trial judge, which are
not clearly erroneous.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In support of John J. Hurley, indi-
vidually, and the South Boston
Allied Veterans Council
Boy Scouts of America (Counsel
of Record: George A. Davidson;
Hughes Hubbard & Reed; One
Battery Park Plaza, New York, NY
10004; (212) 837-6000);
Catholic War Veterans (Counsel
of Record: Thomas Bolan; 36 West
44th Street, New York, NY 10036;
(212) 302-1777);
Joint brief of the Center of
Individual Rights and the New York
County Board of the Ancient Order
of Hibernians (Counsel of Record:
Gary B. Born; Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering; 2445 M Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20037;
(202) 663-6000)
In support of neither party
American Civil Liberties Union
(Counsel of Record: Burt Neuborne;
40 Washington Square South, New
York, NW 10012; (212) 998-6172).
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